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Abstract 
 
  This article argues that the problem of Britain’s social immobility could be challenged under 
the European Convention on Human Rights. In doing so, it suggests that the most tangible 
expression of this is Britain’s ‘segregated’ education system of state and private education, 
which produces wide disparities in outcomes that stand alone by international comparisons. 
Then it frames the education system in the legal setting of the Right to Education per se, and 
without discrimination, provided by the European Convention on Human Rights, and 
informed by the European Social Charter and the UN International Covenant of Social, 
Economic, and Cultural Rights. For this purpose it explores this state of affairs in relation to 
current Western values of freedom of choice, plurality in education, a competitive market 
economy,  notions of meritocracy and, of course, social mobility. 
 
The article concludes that the state is obliged to provide education without discrimination, 
and that the freedoms favouring private education do not outweigh the damage it does to the 
life chances of the vast majority of Britain’s children, the competitive market economy, and 
the related goals of social mobility and meritocracy. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Like New Labour before it, the current Coalition Government has made much of the lack of 
social mobility in Britain. In recent times, for instance, the Government has published 
‘Opening Doors’,1 and ‘Fair Access to Professional Careers.2 More informally, the Minister 
for Education acknowledged his concern that social mobility was worse than in any 
comparable country.
3
 All these concerns unite around one theme: the private/state education 
schism, with the education minster declaring that ‘one of the most stratified and segregated 
education systems of any developed nation’ was England’s ‘dark secret’; thus the private 
schools’ domination of public life was ‘morally indefensible’.4 
 
The oddity here is that this apparent concern for social inequality has never resulted in the 
enactment of dedicated equality legislation.
5
 Equality laws generally are justified by 
reference to the economic and social disadvantages suffered by protected groups. Women 
generally earn less, some ethnic minority groups tend to underperform at school, whilst all 
                                                 
1
 HM Government, Opening Doors, Breaking Barriers: A Strategy for Social Mobility, 
Cabinet Office (April 2011) < www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/opening-doors-
breaking-barriers-strategy-social-mobility > accessed 13 August, 2012. 
2
 A. Milburn, Fair Access to Professional Careers, (Cabinet Office, May 2012) <  
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/fair-access-professional-careers-progress-
report > accessed 13 August 2012. 
3
 Michael Gove, The Times, 11 May 2012. 
4
 Michael Gove, respectively, Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, The ICC, 
Birmingham, 9 October, 2012; The Times, 11 May 2012. 
5
 Equality Act 2010, s.1 provided for a ‘Public sector duty regarding socio-economic 
inequalities’. But the Coalition Government, who inherited the Act, refused to put s.1 into 
force. 
these groups are underrepresented in the most highly paid and powerful jobs.
6
 Yet, they share 
a common and predictable theme: lower social-economic groups dominate those 
underrepresented, underperforming, and poorly paid. So much so that: 
 
‘... in contemporary Britain, social stratification along class and education lines has a 
more enduring force and cuts more deeply in the civic life than ... [attributable] 
characteristics such as religion or ethnicity’.7 
 
Of course, a ‘wealth-gap’ is a necessary consequence of a competitive market economy; this 
is the accepted trade-off for the more general benefits of wealth creation and individual 
freedom. However, existing equality law generally seeks to redress unjustified economic 
inequalities. And on the face of it, this private/state education inequality is unjustified, or, in 
the words of the education minister, ‘morally indefensible’. Yet this glaring inequality – by 
social class – remains largely unchallenged by equality law.  
  
This paper explores the relevance to this matter of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). In doing so, it highlights the extent of social immobility in Britain, and how 
it is tied to education, and then considers a challenge under the Right to Education per se, and 
without discrimination.  
 
Before proceeding further, some parameters are required. First, as noted above, this paper 
does not seek to challenge the ‘wealth-gap’, but rather the distribution of life chances 
(including wealth) by social-economic class through education. Second, its focus is not 
confined to those socially excluded, or an ‘underclass’.8 It is broader, arguing that the vast 
majority of the nation is excluded from its own top echelons. Third, it does not adhere to the 
various theories of ‘equality in education’, which explore how education may precisely be 
‘equal’ in some detail, from pupil to pupil.9 Nor does this paper explore the disparities within 
each of the state and private school sectors. It takes the nation as a whole, and so analyses its 
education system as a whole. The driver of this is the persistent gulf of outcomes between the 
state and private sectors, the tangible evidence of this, and so the likelihood of a legal 
solution. 
 
That said, one existing theory of ‘equality in education’ will be honoured. ‘Equality of 
opportunity’ in education ‘is not a meaningful term’ because outputs cannot be equal due to 
varying factures such as parental support, whilst equality in inputs could result in all schools 
                                                 
6
 See, e.g. for women, ‘Sex and Power in 2011’ Equality and Human Rights Commission < 
equalityhumanrights.com/sexandpower > . For other equality strands, including ethnicity, see 
e.g. H. Metcalf, ‘Pay gaps across the equality strands: a review’. Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, Research Report No. 14 (2009) < 
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/research/14_pay_gaps_across_equalitie
s_review.pdf > both accessed 28 September 2012. 
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 E. Fieldhouse, P. Widdop, R. Ling, Y. Li, D. Cutts, and L. Morales, ‘Civic Life: Evidence 
Base for the Triennial Review (Institute for Social Change at the University of Manchester on 
behalf of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2010), p.115. 
8
 See e.g. ‘Hugh Collins, Discrimination, Equality and Social exclusion’ (2003) 66 MLR 16. 
9
 See e.g. the seminal report, JS Coleman, et al, Equality of Educational Opportunity 
(Washington DC, Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare,  US Government, 1966), and the 
whole volume of (1975) 1 Oxford Review of Education, which is dedicated to equality and 
education. 
being equally bad. A better principle is a ‘reduction in inequality’.10 Accordingly, this paper 
does not explore how the Convention could achieve equality in education, but rather, how it 
might be used to reduce the inequality in education. 
 
 
 
SOCIAL-ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES IN BRITAIN 
 
Social mobility is one of most tangible indicators of class inequality. The politicians agree 
that ‘merit’ is a highly prized value, and that Britain needs more social mobility.11 They have 
reason to be concerned. Research suggests that in Britain social mobility is static, if not in 
decline.
12
 In other words, children are more likely to replicate their parents’ achievements 
and aspirations, rather than participate fully in civil life and a competitive market economy. 
Social mobility and inequality in Britain have roots in education and merit.  
 
 
Education 
 
Social class is not an easy thing to pin down, especially for a legal discourse. Discrimination 
on the ground of being ‘posh’ or being ‘common’ is an elusive concept. It is easier to witness 
than reduce to writing,
13
 especially in legal terms. Two tangible and closely related starting 
points are parental income and education, which, in the main, dictate a British person’s social 
class and financial prosperity. The most tangible and significant connection between parental 
wealth and a child’s prospects is realised in the education it determines. Statistics on the 
educational backgrounds of those working in the upper echelons of society suggest there is 
serious class-related inequality in Britain.
14
 
 
The new coalition cabinet, when formed in May 2010, contained 29 ministers, 18 of whom 
(62 per cent) were privately educated.
15
 A survey last conducted in 2005, reported some 
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 JS Coleman, ‘What is Meant by “an Equal Educational Opportunity”?’ (1975) 1 Oxford 
Review of Education 27. 
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 In addition to Government statements (nn.1-3, above), see Conservative Party, ‘Invitation 
to Join the Government of Great Britain: The Conservative Manifesto 2010’ (Conservative 
Party 2010) 51; Liberal Democrats, ‘Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010’ (Liberal Democrats 
2010) 6; Labour Party, ‘The Labour Party Manifesto 2010: A future fair for all’ (Labour 
Party 2010) Ch.3.  
12
 For the most extensive study here, see J. Blanden, P. Gregg and S. Machin, ‘Educational 
Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility’ in S. Machin and A. Vignoles (eds.) ‘What's the 
Good of Education? The Economics of Education in the UK’, (Princeton University Press, 
2005). See: < http://www.suttontrust.com/public/documents/2IntergenerationalMobility.pdf > 
accessed 28 September, 2012. This research is often cited by the Coalition Government’s 
Universities Minister, David Willetts. See e.g. The Times, 29 September, 2011, p.14; The 
Class Ceiling BBC Radio 4, September 1, 2011 < 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b013qz77 > accessed 28 September, 2012. 
13
 GB Shaw’s Pygmallion (1912) was based on his frustration of the written word’s inability 
to capture Britain’s class accents. 
14
 There are no figures available for England alone. 
15
 Includes Cabinet Ministers and other Ministers attending Cabinet meetings. ‘The 
Educational Backgrounds of Government Ministers in 2010’, (May 21, 2010), Sutton Trust: < 
three-quarters of the senior judiciary,
16
 two-thirds of the leading commercial chambers, and 
55 per cent of partners in the ‘magic circle’ solicitors’ firms were privately educated.17 
Recently, the Sutton Trust found that half of ‘medics’18 were privately educated.19 Similar 
findings can be found elsewhere. In 2000, for instance, of those admitted to medical schools 
in the UK, over 80% were from social classes 1 or 2 (from 5 social classes).
20
 The Sutton 
Trust has found that 54 per cent of top journalists and 54 per cent of chief executive officers 
of FTSE 100 companies
21
 were privately educated. Government research found that for army 
officer training (at Sandhurst), private schools were over-represented, making up 42.3 per cent 
of the 2011/2012 graduates.
22
 The journey from school to a top job normally will be via a top 
university. Private school students are 55 times more likely to win a place at Oxbridge and 22 
times more likely to go to a top-ranked university than the poorest students at state schools.
23
 
 
These figures become arresting once it is realised that private schools account for about seven 
per cent of the nation’s education.24 Coupled with the findings that social mobility has stalled 
(or is in decline),
25
 if anything, the top jobs are likely to become even less accessible to the 
vast majority of the British talent pool. 
 
That this is a peculiar state of affairs is highlighted by comparisons with other nations. This 
peculiarly British problem is recognised by the Coalition, which points out that the influence 
of parental income on the income of children in Britain is among the strongest in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries: ‘The impact 
                                                                                                                                                        
www.suttontrust.com/research/the-educational-backgrounds-of-government-ministers-in-
2010/ > accessed 28 September, 2012.  
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 High Court, Court of Appeal, and House of Lords. 
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 ‘The Educational Backgrounds of the UK's Top Solicitors, Barristers and Judges’ 
(May 2005) < http://www.suttontrust.com/research/law-educational-backgrounds/ > accessed 
28 September, 2012. 
18
 That is medics with positions on the Councils of the medical royal colleges or other 
national representative bodies. These Councils represent doctors at a national level for 
particular specialisms or for the profession as a whole. The figures were compiled for 100 
Council members in 2007 and 100 Council members in 1987, each concluding that 51 per 
cent were privately educated. 
19
 ‘The Educational backgrounds of 500 leading figures’ (May 1, 2007) Sutton Trust: < 
www.suttontrust.com/news/news/the-educational-backgrounds-of-500-leading-figures/ > 
accessed 28 September, 2012. 
20
 See generally, D. Dorling, (2012) Fair Play, Bristol: Policy Press, p.122. The statistics are 
available at: < http://www.sasi.group.shef.ac.uk/fairplay/Material.html > click on ‘Excel 
spreadsheet’, scroll along bottom line for C14T1. See also C14F1 for breakdown by social 
class and ethnicity for years 1996-2000. accessed 28 September, 2012. 
21
 ‘The Educational backgrounds of 500 leading figures’ (May 1, 2007) Sutton Trust: < 
www.suttontrust.com/news/news/the-educational-backgrounds-of-500-leading-figures/ > 
accessed 28 September, 2012. 
22
 Fair Access to Professional Careers (above, n.2), p.61. 
23
 That is, those qualifying for free school meals. See Sutton Trust, ‘Responding to the new 
landscape for university access’ (December, 2010). < 
http://www.suttontrust.com/public/documents/access-proposals-report-final.pdf > accessed 
28 September, 2012.  
24
 Opening Doors (n.1, above), p.5. 
25
 J. Blanden et al, n.12, above. 
of parental income is over one and a half times higher in Great Britain than in Canada, 
Germany, Sweden or Australia’.26 
 
This echoes in broader educational indicators. Between 2000 and 2009, 15-year-olds in the 
UK have fallen from 4th to 16th in international rankings in science, from 7th to 25th in 
literacy and from 8th to 28th in maths.
27
 In a global economic context, Britain’s top-heavy 
allocation of education resources is outstanding. The OECD has found that the UK spends 
about half per pupil on its state schools in comparison with some 29 other nations, ranging 
from Hungry, Australia, the United States, Korea, and Mexico.
28
 Two further OECD reports 
illustrate what this means in the classrooms. The first highlights a discrepancy in class sizes, 
with private school classes about half that of their state counterparts. In a global context, this 
discrepancy is the widest in the survey. As the chart below vividly demonstrates, the United 
Kingdom has by far the widest discrepancy of the 28 nations surveyed, and is less egalitarian, 
for instance, than Turkey, Portugal, Mexico and Chile.
29
 
                                                 
26
 Opening Doors, (above, n.1), para.1.15, citing Blanden, ibid. 
27
 OECD, Programme for International Student Assessment 2009 (2010). This ‘PISA’ survey 
is carried out every 3 years, and the 2009 survey included 65 countries: < 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/30/48578439.pdf  > accessed March 13, 2012. 
28
  See http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx, click on ‘Education and Training’, then ‘Education 
and skills’, then ‘Expenditure by nature and resource category’, then click on ‘Service 
provider’ on the top row for private/state options. 
29
 Education at a glance 2006, Indicator D2: Class size and ratio of students to teaching staff, 
Chart D2.3. < www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/46/37344912.xls > accessed 28 September, 2012. 
The second report, on student/teacher ratios for secondary schools, presents a similar picture. 
For the state sector, whilst the OECD average was 13.4 (students per teacher), the United 
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Chart D2.3. Average class size in public and private institutions by level of education (2004) 
Public institutions Private institutions
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Kingdom could only manage 15.7. By contrast, the UK’s ratio for the private sector was 7.5, 
bettering by far the OECD private school average of 12.1.
30
  
 
These figures show that that Britain has an exceptional coincidence between wealth and 
education, a coincidence that persists individual life chances. Overall, it is clear that Britain is 
labouring under a severe, widespread, and exceptional problem of inequality.  
 
In addition, private school graduates enjoy superior ‘cultural capital’ (such as confidence, 
accent, manners, dining etiquette, deportment and connections), which will have a residual 
value beyond the economic worth of qualifications, and feed respective senses of superiority 
and inferiority. Other factors contribute. First, the cost
31
 of private education render it 
practically out of reach to the Non-wealthy, whose situation is – for all practical purposes - 
immutable. Second, although the law does not mandate the segregation, it does facilitate and 
support it, most notably by the charitable status afforded to private education.
32 
These factors 
can only drive home a deep sense of inferiority, which extends to a person’s ‘citizenship’ and 
‘status in the community’. Such people are less likely to take part in civic life, such as sitting 
as a magistrate, standing for the local council, or voting in elections.
33
 Indeed, it was these 
factors that underpinned the outlawing of racially segregated education in the United States, 
famously, in Brown v Board of Education.
34
 This suggests that segregation per se contributes 
to the problem. 
 
 
THE LEGAL DIMENSION 
 
The starting point is the Council of Europe’s companion treaties, the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the lesser-known European Social Charter.
35
 Principally, the 
                                                 
30
 Ibid, Table D2.3. 
31
 This could be deduced from available statistics: On the last survey, average school fees for 
2012 were £13,7884 per year, whilst the average wage, including bonus, before deductions, 
was £23,932. Simple maths (deduct e.g. tax, national insurance, pension, rent or mortgage, 
household bills,  transport, etc.) informs us that the average family cannot choose to educate 
its children privately. See respectively: < Independent Schools Council Census 2012, p.11. < 
http://www.isc.co.uk/Resources/Independent%20Schools%20Council/Research%20Archive/
Annual%20Census/2012/ISC_Census_2012_Final.pdf  > and ‘Labour Market Statistics, LMS 
June 2012’ <  http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lms/labour-market-statistics/june-
2012/statistical-bulletin.html#tab-Earningsl > Both accessed 28 September 2012. 
32
 e.g. under the Charities Act 2006. It has been held that ‘a charitable organisation which in 
practice excludes poor people remains a charity’ so long as makes a de minimis provision for 
the poor: R (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission for England and Wales 
[2012] 2 WLR 100 (TCC), [228]. 
33
 See e.g. Mori’s findings that in the 2010 general election, 76% social class AB voted, 
falling to 55% for class DE. < www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=2613&view=wide > 
accessed May 25, 2012. More generally, see ‘Social exclusion and political engagement 
Research report’  The Electoral Commission (London, 2005) < 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/63835/Social-exclusion-
and-political-engagement.pdf > accessed May 25, 2012. 
34
 347 US 483 (1954). See further below, text to n.94. 
35
 See < coe.int/socialcharter >. Click ‘The treaties’ on the left. Accessed 22 January 2013. 
Convention provides civil and political rights, whilst the Charter addresses social and 
economic matters. It would appear at first sight that the social/economic and ‘soft law’ nature 
of the Charter would be the more appropriate instrument for such a multi-faceted problem. 
But there are some practical problems with this route. To understand these, a little history is 
required. 
 
The Charter was published in 1961 and a year later ratified by the UK. A revised Charter was 
published in 1996. ‘Enforcement’ was by a ‘Reporting’ system, whereby States would report 
to the European Committee on Social Rights on a regular basis on matters of compliance. In 
1995, a further ‘Collective Complaints’ mechanism was introduced, giving the Committee a 
quasi-judicial role. The UK has not ratified the 1996 Charter nor the complaints 
mechanism.
36
 Only the 1996 Charter provides a ‘right’ to education. This highlights a number 
of practical reasons why the Charter is an inappropriate instrument here.  
 
On the other hand, the Convention provides a right to education, a non-discrimination clause, 
and a more viable enforcement mechanism, all of which the UK has ratified. Further, the 
European Court of Human Rights (‘the Strasbourg Court’) will take into account international 
treaties, including the Charter, when deciding matters under the Convention,
37
 and more 
generally, it has asserted ‘there is no watertight division separating the sphere of social and 
economic rights from the field covered by the Convention.’38  
 
The Convention provides, by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1A2), a right to education and 
that, by Article 14, Convention rights must be secured without discrimination. 
 
 
 
The Right to Education 
 
The Convention provides, by P1A2: 
 
‘No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions 
which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the 
right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own 
religious and philosophical convictions.’ 
 
The first thing to note here is that although the Convention is not aimed at private parties, the 
state cannot absolve responsibility for what happens in private schools. The Strasbourg Court 
has held that: ‘The fundamental right of everyone to education is a right guaranteed equally 
to pupils in State and independent schools, no distinction being made between the two...’39 
                                                 
36
 Ibid. Click ‘Signatures and ratifications’ on the left. Accessed 22 January 2013. 
37
 See e.g. Demir v Turkey Application No.34503/97 (2009) 48 EHRR 54: ‘67 In addition, the 
Court has never considered the provisions of the Convention as the sole framework of 
reference for the interpretation of the rights and freedoms enshrined therein. On the contrary, 
it must also take into account any relevant rules and principles of international law applicable 
in relations between the contracting parties.’ 
38
 Sidabras v Lithuania (2006) 42 EHRR 6, [47], citing Airey v Ireland (App No 6289/73) 
(1979-80) 2 EHRR 305, [26]. 
39
 Costello-Roberts v UK  (1993) 25 EHRR 112, [27]. 
Further, in the Belgium Linguistic Case,
40
 the Court noted that despite its negative 
formulation (‘denied’), P1A2 uses the term 'right' and speaks of a 'right to education', thus 
indicating some positive obligation on the state and so  ‘...by its very nature calls for 
regulation by the State, regulation which may vary in time and place according to the needs 
and resources of the community and of individuals’.41 Thus, a Government cannot be a 
passive observer of education provision, be it private, public, or a mixture of both. The 
second point is that education is one of the Convention’s ‘most important’ rights42 - 
concerned not just its denial, but its quality.
43
 
 
Both the 1996 Charter, and the UN International Covenant of Social, Economic, and Cultural  
Rights (ICSECR 1955), expand on the right to education.  
 
Article 17 of the 1996 Charter provides: 
 
‘With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of children and young persons 
to grow up in an environment which encourages the full development of their personality 
and of their physical and mental capacities, the Parties undertake, either directly or in co-
operation with public and private organisations, to take all appropriate and necessary 
measures designed... to ensure that children ... have the ... education and the training 
they need...’44  
 
 
  The ICSECR 1955, Article 13(1) is in similar terms:  
 
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the 
human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall 
enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, 
tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, 
and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.’ 
[Emphasis supplied.] 
 
Stood alone, these indicate that every child is entitled to an education that can exploit their full 
potential, and be enabled to participate effectively and with dignity in society and civil life. This 
implies that the quality of the education should not vary greatly. Otherwise, some children will 
be denied the opportunity to reach their potential, and are less likely to participate in the top 
jobs and other aspects of civil life. Recently, the Strasbourg Court brought these values up to 
date:  
 
‘... in a modern society, having no more than basic knowledge and skills constitutes a 
barrier to successful personal and professional development. It prevents the persons 
                                                 
40
 (Series A, No. 6) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 252. 
41
 Ibid, p.281, paras.3 and 5. See also, the European Commission on Social Rights’ statement 
in International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (Interights) v Croatia 
Complaint No.45/2007 ECSR (2009) 49 EHRR SE13, [61]. 
42
 DH v Czech Republic (2008) 47 EHRR 3, [139]. For the facts, below, text to n.61. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Part II, Article 17. (Emphasis supplied.) 
concerned from adjusting to their environment, and entails far-reaching consequences for 
their social and economic well-being.’45 
 
By comparison to other states, Britain has the widest discrepancy in funding, class sizes, and 
student/staff ratios, which, predictably, produces sharply contrasting life chances.
46
 And so, it is 
conceivable that the right to education includes the right to a reasonably fair system, evenly 
spread amongst the nation’s children. This presents an argument that Britain’s segregated 
system infringes the right to education, without considering discrimination under Article 14. 
 
The countervailing argument centres on parents’ liberty to do their best for their children. The 
second sentence of P1A2 (above) lends some support, stating that the state should ‘respect’ 
the parents’ ‘religious and philosophical convictions’. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union goes one step further, qualifying its right to education with due respect to 
parents’ pedagogical rights.47 The ICSECR 1955 goes further still and provides the platform 
for private education per se. Article 13(1) is quoted above. Article 13(4) carries the rider: 
 
‘No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of 
individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always 
to the observance of the principles set forth in paragraph I of this article and to the 
requirement that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such 
minimum standards as may be laid down by the State’. 
 
The drafters of these international instruments envisaged, to varying degrees, a right of 
parents to educate their children independently of the state, be it for religious, philosophical, 
pedagogical, or libertarian reasons. Underpinning these rights is a notion of ‘pluralism’ in 
education, necessary in a democracy,
48
 inter alia to guard against indoctrination.
49
 But such a 
right cannot be all-conquering. The riders in P1A2 are subject to the ‘right to education’ in 
the first sentence.
50
 For instance, national laws may prevent parents educating their children 
at home, especially where that education is inferior, or contrary to democratic principles.
51
 
Moreover, it cannot be in the interest of a nation to become too divided, with parallel 
societies adopting separate social, economic, cultural, or philosophical mores, emerging from 
segregated educational systems.
52
 It is notable that Paragraph 13(4) of ICSECR 1955 is 
                                                 
45
 Ponomaryovi v Bulgaria (Application No. 5335/05) (June 21, 2011) [2011] Eq LR 883; 
[2011] ELR 491, [57]. The Court treats the Convention as a ‘Living Instrument’. See n.77, 
below. 
46
 See text et al to n.26. 
47
 Article 14(1) and (3) respectively. 
48
 Konrad v Germany (Application No.35504/03) (2007) 44 EHRR SE8, p.142. 
49
 Folgerø v Norway (Application No.15472/02) (2008) 46 EHRR 47, [84] (b) & (h). 
50
 ‘... the whole of Art.2 of Protocol No.1 being dominated by its first sentence’: Konrad v 
Germany (Application No.35504/03) (2007) 44 EHRR SE8, p 143, citing Campbell v UK 
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society. The reasons given were that the state would no longer be the guarantor of 
‘subject always to’ to paragraph 1. Thus, if plurality goes too far, and creates segregation, the 
‘dominant’ right to education is violated.53 
 
This jurisprudence suggests that the parents’ freedom to educate their children according to 
their own wishes is not absolute where that education would produce a divided society. By 
accent, language, culture, and life chances, Britain is a divided society, and the education 
system is the protagonist. But as well as division, Britain’s education system produces 
inequality. This calls for further consideration, this time under the anti-discrimination principle. 
 
Discrimination and ECHR, Article 14 
 
To bring Article 14 into play, a substantive article must be ‘engaged’, but not necessarily 
breached.
54
 Here, the allegation is that the State is providing education, but in discriminatory 
manner, thus engaging P1A2. 
 
The main questions under Article 14 are establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, 
and the State’s justification defence. 
 
 
The Prima Facie Case 
 
The first matter is to define the groups for comparison. It is tempting to make a simple and 
tangible division between ‘state school’ and ‘private school’ children. This would tend to 
challenge the educational quality and life chances of the respective groups, but not 
segregation per se (because such a challenge merely would assert  that state schools should 
improve). A group defined by who has access to private education is less tangible, but would 
produce a more inclusive comparison, challenging not just what happens at school, but who 
has access. A broad-brush group could be defined on a calculation of average school fees and 
the income required to afford them.
55
 These groups could be labelled Wealthy and Non-
wealthy. Going further, defining (legally) ‘posh’ and ‘common’ would be an unbearably 
fraught exercise, with the obviously posh (say, minor aristocracy upwards) and common (say, 
children on free school meals) at the extremes, and a huge grey area of debate in the middle. 
And so, the optimum comparison is likely to be between the Wealthy and Non-wealthy 
groups. 
 
Of course, such a class of persons must be recognised under Article 14, which covers ‘any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status’. It may well 
be that the non-wealthy could be defined by ‘social origin’. Otherwise, the use of the phrases 
such as and or other status (a fortiori the French version toute autre situation)
56
 opens Article 
14 to more grounds than those listed. Among other things, this non-exhaustive formula 
                                                                                                                                                        
Convention rights, and it would infringe the principle of non-discrimination between 
individuals. 
53
 Konrad v Germany, ibid. 
54
 Otherwise, Art.14 would be redundant. See also e.g. Petrovic v Austria (1998) 33 EHRR 
307, [27]-[29]. 
55
 See n.31 above.   
56
 ‘or any other situation’. Noted in Carson v UK (App. No. 42184/05) (2010) 51 EHRR 13, 
[70]; see also RMJ v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2009] 1 AC 311 (HL), [39]. 
allows for changing values, and discrimination that was once acceptable may become 
unacceptable,
57
 a factor that may be relevant here. The Strasbourg Court has entertained 
Article 14 claims from groups as wide-ranging as owners of non-residential buildings 
(distinct from residential), owners of pit bull terriers (distinct from other breeds of dog), small 
landowners (distinct from large landowners), coastal (distinct from open sea) fishermen, 
foreign residence, and previous employment by the KGB.
58
 More conventionally, the Court 
has recognised sexual orientation, marital status, illegitimacy, trade union status, military 
rank, and conscientious objection,
59
 as falling within this residual category. Thus, if ‘social 
origin’ were inappropriate, it is inconceivable that the class of Non-wealthy, as defined 
above, would fail under ‘other status’. 
 
The next question is whether the situation could be characterised as one of direct or indirect 
discrimination. For direct discrimination, it must be shown that the UK Government presides 
over a system that overtly discriminates against the Non-wealthy. Given that a few of these 
children find ways into private education (e.g. through scholarships), that some state school 
graduates find top jobs and/or elite university places,
60
 and that, no doubt, some state schools 
outperform some private schools, establishing direct discrimination might prove difficult. 
And as Strasbourg affords both direct and indirect discrimination a justification defence, 
there is no great advantage in trying to couch this as case of direct discrimination. 
 
For indirect discrimination, the most obvious case for comparison is DH v Czech Republic.
61
 
Here, primary school children who performed poorly in intelligence tests were placed in a 
special school for those with mental deficiencies. Statistics showed that in one district a 
Roma child was 27 times more likely to be placed in a special school. The result of this 
facially neutral policy was that over half of Roma and just 1.8 per cent of non-Roma children 
were placed in these special schools. The Court cited a number of authorities including the 
United States’ seminal case Griggs v Duke Power,62 and European Community and United 
Nations materials. Accordingly, the Court reasoned that: ‘to guarantee those concerned the 
effective protection of their rights, less strict evidential rules should apply in cases of alleged 
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indirect discrimination’.63 In this case, the Court accepted bare statistics as proof of a prima 
face case of indirect discrimination,
64
 irrespective of any discriminatory intent on the part of 
the respondent state.
65
 In other words, a prima facie case can be established if the effect 
(rather than the purpose) of the practice is to disadvantage a particular group. But the decision 
went further than just discounting discriminatory intent as a necessary ingredient. The 
legislation establishing the special schools and their selection criterion was less important 
than the manner of its implementation.
66
 Hence, the Court spoke in terms of ‘general 
policy’67 and ‘practice’.68 It would seem from this that the absence of a tangible rule, statute, 
or measure need not prevent a claim proceeding. The emphasis is on the state of affairs, 
resulting from a general policy or merely practice.
69
 
 
The perhaps distinguishing here feature is that there was tangible legislation at the root of the 
practice. The ‘Non-wealthy’ claim is on much broader scale, affecting the majority of a 
nation’s schoolchildren. There is no single tangible piece of legislation from which a practice 
can be identified. There are of course numerous statutes and regulations establishing and/or 
regulating both state and private schools (perhaps most contentiously is the rule affording 
charitable status to private schools).
70
 Behind the statistics (above) there is the practice, and 
behind that is a general policy of permitting that practice. In Thlimmenos v Greece
71
 the 
Strasbourg Court said that: 
 
‘The right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the 
Convention is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail 
to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different.’72 
 
 
In combination with DH v Czech Republic, this suggests that a state’s general policy on non-
intervention in a discriminatory state of affairs (evidenced by statistics) within the ambit of a 
substantive Convention Article, could amount to discrimination under Article 14. 
 
The bare statistics show that state-school children are significantly disadvantaged, and that 
these are overwhelmingly from the Non-wealthy group.
73
 There is a Government general 
                                                 
63
 (2008) 47 EHRR 3, [186]. See also Hoogendijk v Netherlands (App No.58641/00) (2005) 
40 EHRR SE22 189, at para.207; and Adami v Malta  (App No 17209/02) (2007) 44 EHRR 
3, [77]-[78]. 
64
 Ibid, [188]. 
65
 Ibid, [184]. 
66
 Ibid, ‘[185]  It was common ground that the impugned difference in treatment did not 
result from the wording of the statutory provisions ....[T]he issue in the instant case is 
whether the manner in which the legislation was applied in practice resulted in a 
disproportionate number of Roma children ... being placed in special schools....’. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
67
 Ibid, [175] and [184]. 
68
 Ibid, [185], [188], [189], [193]. 
69
 See also, G. Hobcraft, “Roma children and education in the Czech Republic: DH v Czech 
Republic: opening the door to indirect discrimination findings in Strasbourg?” [2008] 2 
EHRLR 245, especially at 260. 
70
 See n.32, above. 
71
 (2001) 31 EHRR 14, [44]. 
72
 Ibid, [44]. See also Stec v UK  (2006) 43 EHRR 47, [51]. 
policy acquiescing, at the least, in this state of affairs. Accordingly, there is a prima facie case 
of indirect discrimination. The next question centres on justification. 
 
  
Justification 
 
In line with indirect discrimination jurisprudence,
74
 under Article 14, the State defendant has 
the burden to ‘objectively and reasonably justify’ the challenged discriminatory measure. 
This process divides, loosely, into two stages. First, the general policy must pursue a 
legitimate aim, and second, it must have reasonable relationship of proportionality between 
the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.
75
 Before discussing either, it is 
necessary to establish the ‘standard of review’, in other words, how strictly the law should 
scrutinise the discriminatory practice. 
 
(1) The Standard of Review 
 
There is good reason to suppose that the standard of review should vary, depending on the 
circumstances. Society would expect nowadays a stricter scrutiny of measures based on race 
or gender, than based on, say, age. There are some embryonic signs of this in the Strasbourg 
Court. In a few cases, the Court has subjected a defence to ‘intensive’ scrutiny, demanding 
‘very weighty reasons’ to justify the otherwise discriminatory measure. One emerging theme 
is that these cases can be distinguished by the ground of the discrimination. The Court has 
demanded very weighty reasons in cases of discrimination on grounds of sex, sexual 
orientation, birth out of wedlock (including different treatment of unmarried parents), marital 
status, and nationality.
76
 But if the Court is developing a hierarchical system of scrutiny, it is 
in its very early stage, and so there is no certainty as to its approach to the many and varied 
grounds. 
 
Several possible factors could contribute to the classification. First, the prevailing values at 
the time. As the Court treats the Convention as a ‘living instrument’,77 this is not, on the face 
of it, controversial. But a prevailing value should be distinguished from prevailing mood. 
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Anti-Semitism was widespread and acceptable in many quarters in the years leading up to 
World War II, a practice the Convention was designed to address.
78
 Other factors could relate 
to redress for past wrongs, the effects of which have tumbled down the generations. These 
include a history of purposeful discrimination,
79
 which was invidious perhaps bearing no 
relationship to the group’s abilities,80 or degree of immutability; and that the group lacks the 
political power to obtain redress through political channels.
81
  
 
Quite clearly, in the 21
st
 century, meritocracy is a highly prized value,
82
 whilst education is 
one of the Convention’s ‘most important’ rights.83 The group (‘Non-wealthy’) is practically 
immutable.
84
 Before the widespread state education was introduced near the end of World 
War II,
85
 the non-wealthy suffered an even more considerable disadvantage. And within that 
group, the poor and socially excluded, characterised as the ‘lower classes’, would have 
suffered a history of inferior, invidious, characteristically ‘Dickensian’ treatment, and were 
locked into their class in variety of ways. Further, the inequality here bears little relationship 
to the group’s innate abilities. The Coalition Government itself has highlighted that a more 
highly-skilled workforce could add four per cent to Gross National Product.
86
 
 
On the other hand, a one-person-one-vote democracy suggests that it is harder to argue that 
the group lacks the political power to obtain redress. After all, the Non-wealthy group 
comprises the vast majority of voters, and so ought to able to participate in the decision-
making of the State, notably education policy and their children’s future. But the evidence 
suggests otherwise, with the majority of those in political power coming from the minority 
predominantly wealthy private school sector. This is not a one-off aberration. For a century or 
so, women have had the vote, and yet remain underrepresented in the top jobs (notably 
Parliament) and are underpaid generally, despite comprising about half the electorate. Indeed, 
dedicated anti-discrimination and equal pay legislation has been in place for decades in most 
Western democracies, and sex discrimination appears to attract strict scrutiny in the 
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Strasbourg Court.
87
 The right to vote is no guarantee against discrimination, even against the 
majority. 
 
A connected consideration here is the ‘wide’ margin of appreciation usually afforded to 
states’ economic or social policy.88 For education in itself, the Strasbourg Court has indicated 
that although primary education is the most important, shifts towards ‘“knowledge-based” 
societies’ by ever-more nations means that ‘secondary education plays an ever-increasing 
role in successful personal development and in the social and professional integration of the 
individuals concerned’. Accordingly, the Court has subjected to ‘stricter scrutiny’ 
discrimination in the closely-connected ground of education.
89
 
 
Given this, and the importance of meritocracy and education, the invidious history, practical 
immutability, the inseparability of wealth and education, and that a majority is not immune 
from discrimination, a state policy that discriminates against the Non-wealthy in education 
ought not be afforded a wide margin of appreciation, and should be scrutinised strictly. 
 
(2) Justification - The Legitimate Aim and Proportionality 
 
To evaluate the defence, the severity of the discrimination it is attempting to justify must be 
appreciated. The statistics cited in this paper, along with the sense of inferiority, demonstrate 
the scale and severity of the disadvantage.
90
 It is against this that the justification argument 
has to prevail. 
 
The legitimate aim centres on the parents’ liberty to educate their children independently, 
which is underpinned by the desirability in a democracy for plurality in education. This aim is 
expressed, to various degrees, in a number of treaties recognised by the Strasbourg Court. As 
such, for this reason alone, it must be considered a legitimate aim. This leaves a clash of 
rights, which is normally resolved under the principle of proportionality. 
  
On the face of it, as the statistics show, both domestically and by international comparison, 
Britain’s private education is out of all proportion to this aim. Only a tiny minority actually 
enjoy the ‘freedom’ of choice, and so this freedom does not weigh heavily against the 
considerable inequality. But this does not dismiss the broader principle of pluralism in 
education.
91
 
 
The response to this is two-fold. First, it does not necessarily follow that an egalitarian 
system lacks plurality. No one would suggest that the more egalitarian nations in the 
comparisons (above) lacked plurality in their education systems. Second, imagine the most 
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obvious, but challenging, solution: integration of the state/private systems.
92
 Legislation 
could dictate common objective entry requirements (or their absence) with the state paying 
the fees. This restriction on picking and choosing pupils (according to wealth, and perhaps 
academic entrance requirements) might spread the privilege more evenly amongst Britain’s 
social classes, but privilege would remain in the system. To go further, the best teachers 
should be more evenly spread, most obviously achieved with an equalisation of teachers’ 
minimum qualifications and pay. Either way, individuals would be free to establish new 
schools, albeit within a tighter top-down framework.  
 
Predictably, as the system becomes more egalitarian, it would be less pluralistic. This is a 
generalisation, and with detail and subtlety, it may be that many changes could be made 
without restricting pluralism unnecessarily. And given that pluralism is subordinate to the 
right to education,
93
 and if too entrenched restricts fundamental rights (as it does in Britain), 
it cannot be treated as all-domineering. 
  
THE ‘REAL’ PROBLEM 
 
For many, this paper may appear logical, but unrealistic. At the root of this scepticism, in 
legal terms, is the judiciary’s wariness of encroaching into social-economic matters. This 
problem has been played out in the United States’ Supreme Court. 
 
Famously, in Brown v Board of Education,
94
 it held that the ‘separate but equal’ racially 
segregated education system operated in some States was constitutionally ‘unequal’.95 In 
doing so, the Court lauded the intangible values of education per se, as ‘the very foundation 
of good citizenship’ and the ‘principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training’, without which a child could be expected to 
succeed in life.
96
 The system was unequal because it generated ‘a feeling of inferiority as to 
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to 
be undone.’97 In sum, the denoted sense of inferiority includes the economic benefits of 
education, as well as ‘good citizenship’ and a person’s ‘status in the community’. 
 
Some two decades later, in San Antonio v Rodriguez,
98
 the Court refused to extend Brown v 
Board of Education to wealth discrimination in education. The claim challenged the 
allocation school funds according to the tax raised in that school’s district, thus affording – on 
the whole - the poorest children inferior schooling. The rejection was based around three 
broad reasons. First, education was not a fundamental right: the Constitution did not provide 
a right to education, explicitly or implicitly.
99
 Second, the difference in treatment did not 
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deprive anyone of education.
100
 Third, it was not possible to identify a victim group entitled 
to ‘intensive’ scrutiny of the system, as some poor resided in wealthy areas and vice versa.101  
 
The reasoning is frail. First, the judgment expressed no basis as to why education was less 
valuable than 20 years’ before. Second, the fact that Afro-Americans were not deprived of 
education did not trouble the Brown Court. Only the third of these reasons truly distinguished 
Brown, and that distinction is a hollow one. There remain the ‘built in headwinds’102 to the 
poor, who have no choice but reside in low tax areas and therefore, on the whole, suffer a 
parallel sense of inferiority in economic benefits, good citizenship and status in the 
community. It is, of course, built in headwinds that cause so much inequality for women and 
racial groups, which is normally characterised by the Court as ‘disparate impact’ (indirect 
discrimination).
103
 Further, the education in Brown ostensively was equal, whereas in 
Rodriguez, it was most definitely unequal. 
 
In retrospect, each decision is predictable. But on the face of it, they are not comfortable 
companions. The real basis of Rodriguez lies beneath the legal reasoning provided. United 
States culture, perhaps more than most, is centred on a competitive market economy, where 
there must be (economic) winners and losers. If the Constitution were used to iron out these 
disparities, then the economic system itself is challenged, which is a matter for the 
politicians, not the courts. 
 
However, since Rodriguez, the political, social, economic, and legal context has changed. In 
his re-election address, Barrack Obama proclaimed: 
‘For we, the people, understand that our country cannot succeed when a shrinking few do 
very well and a growing many barely make it.... We are true to our creed when a little girl 
born into the bleakest poverty knows that she has the same chance to succeed as anybody 
else, because she is an American; she is free, and she is equal, not just in the eyes of God but 
also in our own.’104 
 
And as noted above, the Coalition Government has expressed serious concerns over Britain’s 
lack of social mobility, whilst the Strasbourg Court has developed the notion that the 
Convention is a ‘living instrument’, adaptable for the prevailing values,105 presumably social 
mobility being one of them.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
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This brief examination shows that the most tangible aspect of social class division in Britain 
is its segregated education system, which is loaded with social, ethical, and economic ills. It 
stands out as unique in the Western world. The result is that the vast majority of Britain’s 
children are destined to second-class life chances. It offends current values of merit, 
competitiveness, and equality, all associated with social mobility.  
 
The Convention’s Right to Education, and more pertinently perhaps, the right to education 
without discrimination are appropriate vehicles to challenge Britain’s uniquely unequal 
education system. The Strasbourg Court has acknowledged that education is now central to a 
nation’s economic and social wellbeing,106 and with its ‘living instrument’ philosophy, it 
should absorb the prevailing value of social mobility, and thus entertain such a challenge.  
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